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Abstract
We propose a novel perspective to understand deep neu-
ral networks in an interpretable disentanglement form. For
each semantic class, we extract a class-specific functional
subnetwork from the original full model, with compressed
structure while maintaining comparable prediction perfor-
mance. The structure representations of extracted subnet-
works display a resemblance to their corresponding class
semantic similarities. We also apply extracted subnet-
works in visual explanation and adversarial example detec-
tion tasks by merely replacing the original full model with
class-specific subnetworks. Experiments demonstrate that
this intuitive operation can effectively improve explanation
saliency accuracy for gradient-based explanation methods,
and increase the detection rate for confidence score-based
adversarial example detection methods.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks have recently transformed many
areas including visual perceptions, language understanding,
reinforcement learning, etc. Though they become the most
representative intelligent systems with a dominant perfor-
mance, DNNs are criticized for lacking transparency and
interpretability. Better understanding the working mecha-
nism of machine learning systems has become a requested
demand, which is not only beneficial to academic research
but also significant to many critical industries requiring a
high level of safety concerns.
In this paper, we propose a simple and interpretable dis-
entanglement form for deep neural networks, which can
not only reveal neural network’s functional behaviors but
also have application improvement in visual explanation
task [8] and adversarial example detection [1]. The main
idea is that we propose to extract the class-specific sub-
network for each semantic category from a pre-trained full
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Figure 1: Method overview. For each class, we extract a
subnetwork from the full model by learning to activate only
a fraction of neurons on each layer. The extracted class-
specific subnetwork can focus on one class prediction, and
maintain comparable performance with the full model.
model while maintaining a comparable prediction perfor-
mance (Figure 1). To effectively extract the subnetworks,
we utilize the knowledge distillation criteria [2] and model
pruning strategy [4]. We observe that the highly compressed
subnetworks can display an architecture resemblance to
their corresponding categorical semantic similarities.
Furthermore, the interpretable subnetworks extracted by
the proposed method can have further operational influence
in other tasks. One application is visual explanation, which
provides salient regions or features relevant to the model
prediction results. We propose a simple improvement oper-
ation for gradient-based visual explanation method, by just
replacing the full model weights with subnetwork for the
requested explanation class. This can lead to more accurate
and concise salient regions. The similar technique can also
be applied to another application: adversarial sample de-
tection, which detects the malicious samples fooling DNN
classifiers. We propose to use the features generated by the
class-specific subnetworks to construct confidence score-
based detector since the resulting features are observed to
be more separable from adversarial data than those gener-
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ated by full models.
2. Method
Let fθ(·) denote a neural network with pre-trained
weights θ. For one test sample x, the output vector of fθ(x)
is then passed to the softmax activation function, which gen-
erates the prediction probability for each class. The output
fθ(x) for class c, which is usually termed as logit, can be
expressed as f cθ (x), and x denotes a collection of samples
{xi}.
To extract class-specific subnetworks, we consider our
problem under the knowledge distillation framework [2].
Specifically, let p(y|x; θ) denotes the original prediction
made by the full model parametrized by θ for a single sam-
ple x, and we want to extract a subnetwork with the param-
eter θc for class c, whose prediction q(y|x; θc) should be
close to the full model under KL divergence measurement.
Therefore, the objective is
L(θc|x) = KL
(
p(y|x; θ)||q(y|x; θc)
)
+ Ω(θc), (1)
where Ω(·) is an extra regularization term which encourages
θc to be sparse enough. We adopt `1-norm as regularization
term.
We observe that the original full model already has
a good performance for single class binary classification.
Therefore, the probability can be represented by transform-
ing the output logit into p(y = c|x; θ) = σ(f cθ (x)), where
σ is Sigmoid function. Then the objective in Equation (1)
can be rewritten as
L(θc|x) = −Ep(y|x;θ)q(y|x; θc) + Ω(θc) + const
= BCE(f cθ (x), f
c
θc(x)) + Ω(θc), (2)
where BCE stands for binary cross entropy function which
is BCE(a, b) = −a log b − (1 − a) log(1 − b). By using
Monte Carlo approximation, we can obtain the final objec-
tive for learning subnetwork θc, which is
L(θc) =
∫
x∈D
p(x)L(θc|x)dx ≈ 1|D|
∑
x∈D
L(θc|x). (3)
As for the parametrization form of θc, we associate con-
trol gates on multiple layers’ output channels in the net-
work. The control gate values λi then modulate the output
features of i-th layer by channel-wise multiplication.
3. Adversarial Sample Detection
A school of adversarial sample detection methods are
based on confidence scores discrimination. By evaluating
the confidence score based on training data density estima-
tors in feature space, one can adequately judge whether a
sample appears on the true data manifold with high proba-
bility or not.
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Figure 2: Class-specific subnetworks can improve the dis-
criminability between true data and adversarial data in fea-
ture space. Five hundred true images and corresponding
adversarial samples are displayed by using the UMAP em-
bedding projection of VGG16 penultimate features. The
different predicted labels are marked with different colors.
(a) feature embeddings generated by the original full model
weights. (b) feature embeddings produced by their class-
specific subnetworks.
Now with the class-specific subnetworks, we can further
increase the discriminability of confidence score methods.
Figure 2a have displayed clustering patterns, but the ad-
versarial samples have high overlaps with true data mani-
fold. Figure 2b demonstrates that adversarial samples be-
come more separable when using the features generated
from class-specific subnetworks.
Detection based on Mahalanobis distance In this section,
we will formally present the improved detection algorithm
based on the Mahalanobis distance score proposed in [3].
Following the definition in [3], the Mahalanobis confidence
score M(x) for a test sample x is computed by measuring
the Mahalanobis distance between x and its closest class-
conditional Gaussian distribution in feature space:
M(x) = max
c
−(fθ(x)− µˆc)>Σˆ
−1
(fθ(x)− µˆc), (4)
where µˆc and Σˆ are the empirical class mean
and covariance for features of training samples
{(x1, y1), · · · , (xN , yN )}.
With the extracted subnetworks, we can modify the em-
pirical mean and covariance estimation by using the class-
specific feature as instead. Suppose that θc is the resulting
subnetwork for class c. Then µˆc and Σˆ can be estimated by
µˆNEWc =
1
Nc
∑
i:yi=c
fθc(xi)
Σˆ
NEW
=
1
N
∑
c
∑
i:yi=c
(fθc(xi)− µˆc)(fθc(xi)− µˆc)>.(5)
Similar to [5], the other low-level features in the neural
network can also be combined to estimate confidence and a
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Figure 3: Subnetwork representation visualization by 2D UMAP embedding projection. For each figure, there show 1,000
subnetworks which are categorized into 25 clusters using a hierarchical clustering algorithm. For some apparent groups, we
denote with their composition members’ label names. These subnetwork representations display a resemblance to their class
semantic similarity.
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Figure 4: Visual explanation saliency by using class-specific model subnetworks. For each column, we show that for gradient-
based explanation methods, the visual saliency can be improved by just replacing the full model weights with the subnetwork
for the requested explanation class.
Method
AlexNet VGG16 ResNet50
Normal Subnet Normal Subnet Subnet Subnet
α∗ Err(%) α∗ Err(%) α∗ Err(%) α∗ Err(%) α∗ Err(%) α∗ Err(%)
Saliency 3.5 46.11 3.5 44.80 5.0 48.01 5.0 44.21 5.0 49.20 4.0 41.64
Deconv [8] 4.5 49.61 4.5 47.00 5.0 49.87 5.0 46.85 3.5 47.26 4.0 50.32
Guided-BP [10] 5.0 43.05 4.5 42.20 7.0 41.66 6.0 40.83 6.5 47.52 4.0 40.25
GradCAM [7] 1.0 54.13 1.0 51.48 1.0 49.21 1.0 46.94 1.0 42.63 1.0 45.14
IntGrad [11] 7.5 43.01 6.0 42.71 9.0 43.05 6.0 41.05 8.5 47.60 4.0 41.85
SmoothGrad [9] 7.0 48.72 4.0 47.01 9.5 53.57 2.0 47.75 3.0 52.37 2.5 51.98
Table 1: Weakly supervised localization errors on ImageNet validation dataset. “Normal” indicates standard explanation
practice by using full model weights regardless of the requested explanation class. “Subnet” indicates the proposed practice
by replacing with class-specific subnetworks. α∗ is optimized on held-out 5,000 images from ImageNet training dataset.
“Err” indicates localization error (lower is better).
logistic regression detector is trained on a held-out valida-
tion data to weight each feature importance.
4. Experiments
We extract class-specific subnetworks of three typical
ImageNet pre-trained networks: AlexNet, VGG16, and
ResNet50. When optimizing the subnetwork for class c, for
each epoch a balanced training set is sampled dynamically
by including all the 1,000 images of class c, and an equal
number of randomly chosen images for all the other classes.
The final subnetwork is selected after T = 5 epochs with
minimum loss, below the sparsity level τ = 0.5. Balance
parameter γ = 0.05. Mini-batch size is 64. The learning
rate for Adam optimizer is 0.1 for all the experiments.
Subnetworks Visualization For each subnetwork, the as-
sociated control gates can reflect the utilization of each
Table 2: Adversarial sample detection AUROC (%) for different methods. Our method improves upon Mahalanobis distance
score by replacing feature extractor with class-specific subnetworks to estimate empirical means and covariance matrices.
For unknown attack detection, FGSM samples denoted by “seen” are used for training logistic regression detector.
Dataset Mehod
Detection AUROC (%) Unknown Attack Detection AUROC (%)
FGSM BIM DeepFool CW FGSM (seen) BIM DeepFool CW
CIFAR-10
KD + PU 81.21 82.28 81.07 55.93 81.21 16.16 76.80 56.30
LID 99.71 96.39 88.47 82.93 99.71 95.38 71.86 77.53
Mahalanobis 99.92 99.59 91.53 95.85 99.92 98.91 78.06 93.90
Ours 99.97 99.17 91.91 96.88 99.97 99.11 82.45 95.62
CIFAR-100
KD+PU 89.90 83.67 80.22 77.37 89.90 68.85 57.78 73.72
LID 89.27 85.19 64.80 75.35 89.27 55.82 63.15 75.03
Mahalanobis 99.77 96.72 83.93 91.65 99.77 96.38 81.95 90.96
Ours 99.81 96.95 82.44 94.41 99.81 95.84 77.80 92.56
SVHN
KD+PU 82.67 66.19 89.71 76.57 82.67 43.21 74.26 67.85
LID 95.72 87.41 88.81 85.66 95.72 84.88 67.28 76.58
Mahalanobis 99.63 97.14 95.46 92.13 99.63 95.39 72.20 86.73
Ours 99.54 97.24 95.82 93.63 99.54 96.38 78.75 91.09
layer when predicting specific class. Figure 3 displays the
relationships between different class-specific subnetworks
when projected onto the 2D plane using the UMAP algo-
rithm. Here we can observe that the subnetwork represen-
tations tend to be more similar when their corresponding
labels are semantically closer.
Improving Visual Explanation Visual explanation meth-
ods usually present the highlighted salient regions in the
input image as explanation results. For most of visual
explanation methods [8, 10, 11, 9, 7], they all generate
the visual saliency by following specific predefined “lay-
erwise attribution backpropagation” rules [6]. Here we
propose a simple alternative explanation procedure for the
above gradient-based explanation methods, by using class-
specific subnetwork as model weights when explaining the
requested class. Figure 4 shows that by using the extracted
class-specific subnetwork, these methods can generate more
clear and accurate salient regions focusing on the main ob-
jects.
Weakly Supervised Object Localization To demonstrate
the improvement of visual explanation methods more rigor-
ously, here we adopt the Weakly Supervised Object Local-
ization (WSOL) evaluation protocol. Table 1 summarizes
the results. The proposed method can reduce localization
errors across different methods. These results validate that
the proposed practice can help improve gradient-based vi-
sual explanation methods.
Detecting Adversarial Samples Following the similar ex-
perimental setups in [3], we experiment with four attacking
methods including FGSM, BIM, DeepFool and `2-version
CW attack. We first extract class-specific subnetworks for
each dataset. Then the Mahalanobis scores are calculated
according to Equation (5). The subsequent logistic regres-
sion detector setups are the same as [3].
We compared three state-of-the-art logistic regression
detectors, which are based on 1) the combinations of ker-
nel density (KD) and predictive uncertainty (PU) [1], 2) the
local intrinsic dimensionality scores (LID) [5] and 3) the
Mahalanobis distance scores [3].
The middle columns of Table 2 summarize the detection
results. Our method can generally improve detection suc-
cess rates over the baseline methods across different attack-
ing methods. We also train the logistic regression detec-
tor on FGSM and evaluate its detection performance on the
other types of adversarial samples. The right columns of
Table 2 summarize the results. Our method can still outper-
form baseline methods in most cases. The results validate
the power of class-specific subnetworks to detect adversar-
ial examples.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we explore the possibility of understand-
ing DNNs from disentangled subnetworks. The discovery
reveals that the extracted subnetworks can display a resem-
blance to their corresponding class semantic similarity. Fur-
thermore, the proposed techniques can effectively improve
the localization accuracy of visual explanation methods,
and detection success rate of adversarial sample detection
methods.
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